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The modern direction of Canadian
labour and employment law has
been significantly influenced by
legal developments in the United
States and Great Britain. Our heavily
regulated system of industrial
relations is directly borrowed from
the American Wagner Act. Canadian
law on wrongful dismissal has been
largely imported from the English
common law. Yet, unlike these two
source countries, Canada has taken a
distinct path respecting the legal
regulation of union democracy and
internal trade union affairs. While
both the U.S. Congress and the
British Parliament have enacted
stringent legislation governing
union elections and union officers’
duties, the Canadian approach has
been largely one of statutory
abstinence. Comparatively speaking,
Canadian unions enjoy greater
institutional freedom of association
than their American and British
siblings, although they also suffer,
like their counterparts, from a
largely conservative judiciary that
has commonly misunderstood the
particular culture and social role of
trade unions.
 Four reasons in particular
explain this particular Canadian
approach towards the law
governing union democracy. First,
Canadian unions have historically
encouraged a culture of democratic
practices, and they have been able to
give voice to both the employment
and the social aspirations of their
membership. The 1996 federal Task
Force reviewing the Canada Labour
Code stated that:
”Canadian trade unions exhibit a
high level of internal democracy
and genuinely represent the
interests and wishes of their
membership.”
Second, unions in Canada have
generally avoided both the stain of
corruption that has tainted parts of
the American labour movement, and
the specter of unbridled militancy
that had characterized a number of
British unions. While incidences of
corrupt unionism have occasionally
appeared in Canada, unions that
encouraged or tolerated patterns of
corruption or violence in Canada
were generally outside the
mainstream labour congresses, or
were expelled once the mainstream
leadership was satisfied that the
patterns were endemic.
Third, there has never been a
sustained political or popular
demand in Canada for a significant
legislative intrusion into internal
UNION DEMOCRACY AND THE LAW IN CANADA
Michael Lynk
Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
Lynk 17
union affairs. The cry for  “union
democracy” from conservative
political parties has never acquired
the influence it has in the United
States and Britain. As well,
Canadian employers, unlike their
American counterparts, have
generally accepted the fundamental
premises of collective bargaining,
and have not built up a significant
antiunion consulting industry or
sought as a common strategy to
undermine the legitimacy of unions.
 And fourth, the traditional
British common law concept of
unions as voluntary organizations,
and therefore entitled to self-
government, has long influenced
Canadian legislators and courts. The
English and Canadian courts viewed
the membership relationships of
these organizations as purely
personal and contractual, and they
therefore would not review an
internal decision of a union except
on narrow procedural grounds.
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
UNION DEMOCRACY IN
CANADA
The legislative intervention into
internal trade union affairs by the
federal government and the ten
provinces has been quite modest.
While the certification process
requires applicant unions to have a
constitution and a set of elected
officers, Canadian labour legislation
is silent on the democratic quality by
which union officers are elected. In
turn, labour boards have read this
statutory abstinence to mean that
their jurisdiction to oversee the
democratic life of unions is
restricted. The prevailing view is
expressed in a 1993 Ontario Labour
Relations Board ruling RWDSU and
New Dominion Stores involving a
complex trusteeship application:
“The [Ontario] Labour Relations
Act is primarily concerned about
institutional collective bargaining
relationships, the trade union in
its role as statutory bargaining
agent. The statute does not
purport to regulate internal union
affairs, nor does it prescribe any
general code of democratic practice.
Indeed, the statute is exceedingly
(and we think, intentionally)
sparse in respect of such matters,
leaving them to be determined,
for the most part, in accordance
with the union’s constitution”
[italics in original].
Consequently, the appropriate
forum for litigating issues of union
democracy in Canada is divided
between labour relations boards and
the courts. The division of
jurisdiction is the residual
consequence of the legislative
reluctance to intervene through
labour relations boards in internal
union affairs. This has left the courts
to fill the judicial vacuum. If
specifically addressed in legislation,
then the particular labour relations
board has the jurisdiction to rule on
the matter. If the legislation is silent,
then the common law (or, in Québec,
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the civil law) courts assume the
jurisdiction, which has given them
the predominant role in supervising
union constitutions.
The primary legal tool for the
courts to intervene has been a
reliance on the contract theory of
union constitutions. This theory
holds that every member, by joining
the union, enters into a contractual
relationship through the constitution
with every other member. This
allows a dissident member to sue the
leadership on breach of contract
grounds if he or she can establish a
violation of a constitutional
provision. In turn, this has permitted
the courts to act as an appellate
body, interpreting the contracts and
providing relief to union members
for any violation of the constitution
and bylaws.
The irony of this significant
residual role of the courts in union
democracy issues should not be lost.
The Canadian labour movement
fought hard during the 1930s and
1940s for legislation that would
remove the courts, whom they saw
as strongly hostile to unions and
imbued with a stiffly contractual
approach to decision-making, from
any involvement in the legal
regulation of industrial relations.
Yet, the labour movement, by also
opposing any statutory regulation of
their internal affairs, has unwittingly
sustained a limited but potentially
potent involvement for the courts.
Indeed, aside from judicial review of
labour board decisions and the
occasional monitoring of picket line
activity in some jurisdictions, the
supervision of internal union affairs
is the Canadian judiciary’s only
remaining area of original




The statutory regulation of union
elections and union officers is almost
entirely absent in Canadian labour
statutes. Québec legislation
regulates only one discrete
procedural aspect of the electoral
process: it requires that elections for
union office be conducted by secret
ballot. Manitoba and New
Brunswick forbid a union, or
someone acting on behalf of a union,
to interfere through intimidation or
coercion with the right of a union
member to become, or remain, a
union officer. Saskatchewan requires
that a union give members
reasonable notice of all meetings
that they are entitled to attend. In
Ontario, the then-governing New
Democratic Party in 1993 restricted
the ability of the parent leadership
of construction unions to remove
from office, alter the duties of, or
impose a penalty on, an elected or
appointed officer without just cause.
Otherwise, the rules governing such
matters as the rules for elections and
candidate conduct, length of office,
the fiduciary responsibilities of
officers, and removal from office are
governed almost entirely by union
constitutions, and supervised
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primarily by the courts as a
contractual matter.
The conduct of union elections
The Canadian common law has
stated that the results of an election
will be upheld if it has been
conducted in substantial compliance
with the union’s constitution and
by-laws. A mere irregularity in
campaign or voting procedures that
has not materially affected the
election results will usually not be
sufficient to nullify a union election.
However, while the Canadian courts
have expressed this as a principle,
they have not been shy about
defining a broad range of procedural
breaches of an internal election as a
significant irregularity requiring a
new election. The courts have
intervened to quash union elections
where voting secrecy was
inadequate, ballots were distributed
to ineligible members, ballots were
tampered with, eligible members
were not given ballots, a voting
deadline extension was not
communicated to some of the union
electorate, and ballots were
numbered and printed in a manner
which could reveal the identity and
voting choice of the union members.
Union officers
The duties and liabilities of union
officers in Canadian law are found
primarily in the governing union
constitution, and are enforced by the
courts within the context of contract
law. The common law dominates the
regulation of this area of trade union
activities, although again there is
scant caselaw to draw on.
Legislation in Canada has regulated
the duties of officers in only one
area: the liability of union leaders for
participation in an unlawful strike or
for violating other provisions of the
governing labour statute.
The common law in Canada has
commented on two areas of
responsibility resting with union
officers: the scope of presidential
authority in relation to the union
executive and the nature of the
fiduciary duty of honesty owed by
an officer to her or his national
union. Both common law duties
speak to the subordination of
individual or local officers to
collective authority in the decision
making and the management of
union assets.
The courts have drawn from
prevailing principles of company
law to prefer the primacy of
collective decision-making over the
authority of an individual executive
officer. In FASWOC v. Schuster, a
1987 British Columbia case, a union
president and the national executive
fell into a paralyzing dispute over
the president’s authority to dismiss
staff unilaterally and to initiate legal
action in the name of the union. The
British Columbia Supreme Court,
comparing similar circumstances
between company officers and
corporate boards, read the union
constitution to say that the
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president’s authority was
subordinate to the executive.
The courts have also held that
local union officers have a fiduciary
duty towards the parent union to act
honestly when dealing with union
assets. In CUPE v. Deveau, a 1977
case from Nova Scotia, the union
constitution stated that the assets of
a local, on dissolution, all reverted to
the parent. Before the members of a
local seceded to join another union,
the local executive arranged to
distribute almost all the funds of the
local to the membership in the guise
of a cost-of-living allowance. The
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found
that the local executive violated its
fiduciary duty it owed to the parent
union, and ordered the officers





amended their labour legislation to
provide that deposed or disciplined
officers and members are entitled to
natural justice (procedural fairness)
throughout the internal proceedings
against them. In these provinces,
labour relations boards now have
jurisdiction over some officer
removal issues, and they have the
authority to look beyond union
constitutions to the common law
principles of natural justice. In
recent rulings applying this new
power, labour boards in these
provinces have struck down
decisions to remove officers where
the union disciplinary body did not
provide proper notice of the
allegations or the hearing, or where
internal tribunal bias was found.
Union officers in Ontario’s
construction sector, where unions
are predominantly led by
international (i.e. American) unions,
have been particularly vulnerable to
their parent union’s penchant for
imposing trusteeships over
Canadian locals.   The Ontario Labour
Relations Act was recently amended
to forbid a parent union from
ousting an officer from her or his
position unless the Ontario Labour
Relations Board was satisfied that
just cause was established. Yet, even
here, the Board has resisted a broad
reading of the provision, stating in
one recent officer removal case that
the purpose of the amendments was
to protect local union autonomy and
was not meant to address the rights
of individual union officers.
THE UNION AND INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS: DISCIPLINE AND
REPRESENTATION
The majoritarian principle of
representation, that if a majority of
employees in a bargaining unit vote
in favour of a particular union as
their bargaining representative, the
union becomes the exclusive
representative for all employees in
the bargaining unit, is a centrepiece
of the Wagner Act legislation in the
United States and Canada. To
temper the extensive authority over
the membership that the principle
gives to unions, Canadian
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legislatures have enacted provisions
to regulate both the limits of internal
union discipline and the quality of
collective agreement representation.
In both areas, the degree of
legislative intervention has been
restrained, and jurisdiction has been
split between labour relations
boards and the courts.
Union Discipline
Legislatures in Canada have enacted
two primary methods for regulating
union authority to discipline
members. The first has been to blunt
the impact of an expulsion or
suspension decision without
limiting the union’s right to make
that decision. Essentially, this is
done by giving the union the power
to discipline, but restricting it from
compelling the employer to dismiss
an employee on the sole basis that
she or he has been expelled or
suspended from union membership.
These provisions act as a legal
counter-balance to the legislative
right of unions to negotiate union
security clauses in collective
agreements that require all
employees in the bargaining unit to
pay union dues or even, in some
workplaces, to hold union
membership as a condition of
employment.
Legislative limitations on
dismissing an employee from
employment as a result of an
expulsion or suspension from union
membership generally fall into three
overlapping categories: (i) dismissal
from employment is only permitted
if the member has failed to pay
periodic union dues; (ii) dismissal is
prohibited for various stated
reasons, such as the discriminatory
application of membership rules,
membership in another union, or
engaging in activity against the
incumbent trade union; and (iii)
dismissal is prohibited unless the
reasons for expulsion are specifically
permitted by statute.
These provisions limit the reasons
for which union discipline can result
in the loss of employment. They do
not otherwise restrict the right of
unions to discipline members for
breaches of listed constitutional
provisions.
The second legislative method of
protecting union members has been
to regulate the union disciplinary
process itself. One way has been to
ensure minimum procedural
standards in internal disciplinary
hearings. Several jurisdictions,
Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, Saskatchewan and the federal
sector, ensure that union members
receive a disciplinary hearing that
meets the requirements of fairness.
These requirements usually include:
the right to know the charges; the
right to reasonable notice of the
hearing dates; the charges must be
specified in the constitution; the trial
must be in substantial compliance
with the constitutional
requirements; the right to a hearing,
including the ability to call evidence
and make submissions; the
presiding panel members must act
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and decide in good faith; the verdict
must be based only on the actual
evidence adduced; and, in serious
cases, the right to be represented by
counsel.
Legislatures have also intervened
to regulate the degree of
punishment which unions can
impose on their members. This has
been achieved by prohibiting unions
from acting in an unreasonable,
unfair, or discriminatory manner.
Generally, if a union can satisfy a
labour relations board that the
discipline serves a labour relations
purpose, that it has not been applied
selectively, and that the punishment
is proportionate to the offence, then
the union’s decision to discipline a
member will not be struck down.
The majority of union discipline
cases that have reached labour
boards in Canada have involved
issues of either crossing picket lines
or allegations of dual membership
and related conduct detrimental to
the union. Labour boards have
clearly recognized that individual
members have the right to be free of
spurious punishment or retaliation,
but they have balanced this
imperative with the recognition that
unions must have the authority to
act against strike breakers if they are
to be able to maintain an effective
bargaining force. The 1980 decision
of the Saskatchewan Labour
Relations Board in IWA and Moose
Jaw Sash and Door Co., where several
union members had refused to
honour a legal picket line is
illustrative. The Board ruled that the
internal punishment (expulsion
from the union) of the members for
strike-breaking lay within the
authority of the union:
“Any crossing of a picket line by
a member of the union defies the
will of the majority of the
members of the bargaining unit
and constitutes strike breaking,
which in any form, certainly
threatens the effectiveness of the
strike, and, in many cases, the
very life and existence of the
union local. It is difficult to
imagine any other act by a
member which a union would
consider to be more treasonous
conduct to it.”
However, the ability by a union to
punish for strike-breaking is not
open-ended. If the strike or picket
lines are unlawful, any member who
refuses to comply with it would be
protected from internal discipline.
As well, the internal discipline must
be consistently applied, and based
upon clear rules or policy in the
constitution or by-laws.
Duty of Fair Representation
Canadian labour law has established
a duty of fair representation that
prohibits trade unions from acting in
a manner that is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith
towards any employee (and not just
union members) whom it represents.
The imposition of the duty is a
statutory quid pro quo for the union’s
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exclusive bargaining rights. It exists
in every Canadian jurisdiction
through explicit statutory provision
or through a common law obligation
enforceable by the courts. The
Supreme Court of Canada has stated
that the duty requires the
representation to be “fair, genuine
and not merely apparent,
undertaken with integrity and
competence, without serious or
major negligence, and without
hostility towards the employee.”
In law, unions must represent
employees fairly during the
administration of a collective
agreement, and several jurisdictions
have extended the duty to the
union’s conduct during collective
bargaining. In representing an
employee, unions must turn their
mind to the merits of the issue, they
must not act negligently during their
investigation, and their decisions
must not be tainted by malice or ill-
will. Should a labour board find a
union in breach of the duty,
remedies include sending a
grievance to arbitration, ordering the
union to pay for independent
counsel to represent the grievor at
arbitration, waiving any time limits
objections to arbitration that the
employer might have, and requiring
the union to compensate the grievor
for a portion of her or his losses
should the grievance subsequently
be successful at arbitration.
Since the duty was introduced in
Canada in 1970, caselaw has shown
a considerable degree of sensitivity
towards the various interests that
unions must weigh, including the
availability of resources, the
competing demands by different
groups of employees, and the fact
that most local union leaders are
volunteers. While labour boards
receive a relatively high volume of
fair representation complaints, only
a small portion, less than 2 per cent ,
are successful against unions. This is
likely the result of two factors: the
modest standard of representation
that the law has imposed, and the
generally satisfactory quality of the
work that unions perform on behalf




Aside from a few legislative
requirements to file constitutions
and make financial information
available to members, the
administrative apparatus of unions
is almost entirely left to the internal
constitution, with the courts
providing the final supervision.
Even with trusteeships, with all its
potential for misuse to squelch
dissent and local democracy, there
has been little statutory intervention.
Trusteeships
The imposition of a trusteeship is a
significant intrusion by a parent
union into the democratic life of a
local. It usually involves the removal
from office of the locally elected
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officers, the surrender of control
over its finances and administration,
and the suspension of membership
meetings and committees. Union
trusteeships have been imposed
only rarely in Canada, and generally
only for a short duration. Primarily
because the weapon of trusteeship
has not often been used in an
oppressive or authoritarian manner,
Canadian labour law has left the
regulation of union trusteeships
largely up to the labour movement.
Only two provinces, Ontario and
British Columbia, have legislation
regarding trusteeships, and even
they focus largely on procedural
issues. Both provinces require that a
parent union imposing trusteeship
file a statement with the labour
relations board within sixty days
setting out the terms by which the
trusteeship is to be exercised.
However, the parent union is
obliged only to seek consent from
the labour board should the
trusteeship extend beyond a year.
The only other limitation that either
province places over the exercise of
a trusteeship authority is the recent
requirement in Ontario that a parent
union in the construction industry
cannot place a local into trusteeship
without just cause. Where its
jurisdiction has been invoked, the
Ontario Board has generally
consented to a continuation of a
trusteeship where a legitimate
labour relations purpose can be
established. It has refused to extend
a trusteeship where it was not
satisfied that the original purpose of
the trusteeship was still being served
and where the parent could provide
no assurances that local elections
would be held in the near future as
required by the international
constitution.
Parent-Local Relationships
With one exception, Canadian
labour law has left the regulation of
parent-local relations (aside from
trusteeships) entirely in the hands of
union constitutions and ultimately
the courts. In Ontario, recent
amendments restricted the authority
of parent construction unions,
largely headquartered in the United
States, from intervening in the
affairs of their Ontario locals
without just cause. These provisions
have increased the role and
authority of the construction locals
within the union in the areas of
bargaining rights, work and
geographic jurisdiction, and the
administration of benefit plans. In
cases where the legislation conflicts
with the parent union’s constitution,
the statute prevails.
Canadian courts have invariably
upheld the predominant
constitutional authority of the
parents during intra-union disputes
- defecting locals, conflicts over
bargaining authority, or ownership
of property. The courts apply
contract analysis to interpret the
union’s governing documents.
While this judicial line has been
criticized by labour law academics
as a frustration of democratic
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principles, it is a faithful application
by the courts of the explicit location
of constitutional authority.
Accordingly, decisions have stated
that defecting locals are not allowed
to hinder the efforts of the parent to
recover assets constitutionally
belonging to the central authority. In
effect, this prohibits dissidents
attempting to lead a local’s
membership out of a union from
using the assets and resources of the
local to finance the defection, and
bans the insurgent local leadership
from using the name, trade marks,
or insignias of the parent union in
the new organization.
Mergers and Amalgamations
Mergers have been a growing trend
in the Canadian labour movement in
the 1990s. These consolidations have
been in response both to the
increasing concentration among
Canadian corporations and to
member demand for more efficient
delivery of bargaining and
administrative services.
Canadian labour law regulates
two different types of union
succession. Most commonly, unions
are required to seek successorship
certifications from labour relations
boards when ownership of the
workplace changes hands or a
corporate merger or restructuring
has occurred. This is often quite
straightforward but a corporate
ownership change, merger, or
restructuring can result in the
intermingling of workforces and
unions. A representation election is
conducted by the appropriate labour
board to determine a new
bargaining agent. The effect of a
declaration by a labour board that a
union has acquired successorship
rights is two-fold: it grants the
successor union all of the statutory
bargaining rights and duties of its
predecessor, and it requires the
employers of the affected union
membership to recognize the change
in bargaining agent status in all
respects.
Second, when unions themselves
decide for efficiency or institutional
reasons to merge or amalgamate
with another union, they are
required to follow the merger
provisions in their respective
constitutions. Canadian labour
relations boards have approved
union mergers and amalgamations
where they are satisfied that the vote
was held with sufficient notice, it
was organized by a duly elected
executive, it was available to all
members, with relevant information
made available to all, and a bona
fide opportunity was provided to
the membership to express their
views and democratically
demonstrate their wishes.
Underlying this liberal attitude has
been the recognition by labour
boards of the importance of
respecting the autonomy and
internal traditions of union
governance.
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UNIONS AND POLITICS: THE USE
OF UNION DUES FOR POLITICAL
EXPRESSION
The idea that trade unions should
act as the political voice of labour,
rather than merely as the collective
bargaining representative of
workers, has become accepted in
Canadian politics and law, although
not without controversy. The
principal trade union congresses and
their affiliates in English Canada
and Québec have long been closely
affiliated with social democratic
parties. They have acted as pressure
groups in support of a wide variety
of public policy goals, and they have
more than occasionally participated
in political (and invariably illegal)
strikes protesting particular
government policies.
While there are a number of
significant aspects concerning the
relationship between trade unions,
politics, and the law in Canada, a
burning issue respecting union
democracy has been the use of
membership dues for social
purposes beyond the confines of
collective bargaining and internal
union administration. This issue
raises controversies that are at the
heart of the law and union
democracy debate: What is the
nature of freedom of association?
What is the appropriate role of the
law in regulating internal trade
union affairs? What is the social role
of unions, and how is that balanced
with the right of individual union
members to abstain from
involvement in selected union
causes?
These matters came to a head in
Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., where the
Supreme Court of Canada in 1991
upheld the right of unions to spend
their funds on non-collective
bargaining objectives, despite a
claim by a dissident member that he
objected to such expenditures. The
ruling gave considerably greater
freedom to Canadian unions to
decide on dues expenditures than
their American and British
counterparts, where courts and
statutes have placed stringent
limitations on union political and
social spending. It also displayed the
greater liberalism of the Supreme
Court of Canada towards union
democracy issues, in contrast to the
more jaundiced and inarticulate
approach of many lower Canadian
courts. Lavigne now stands as the
most significant decision in
Canadian law on internal democracy
and on union rights and
responsibilities.
Mervyn Lavigne, an instructor at
an Ontario community college, had
not joined the teachers’ union at the
college, but was nonetheless
required under the Rand formula to
pay the equivalent of union dues. In
1984, Mr. Lavigne initiated a
challenge under the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms arguing that the
provisions of the labour legislation
which permitted the expenditure of
union dues contributed by non
members for purposes unrelated to
collective bargaining contravened
Lynk 27
his Charter guarantees to freedom of
association and expression. While
acknowledging that union dues
collected under the Rand Formula
and spent on collective bargaining
were justified, Mr. Lavigne objected
to financial contributions made by
the union to the New Democratic
Party, to a disarmament campaign,
to pro-choice abortion groups, to
striking British miners, and to
medical aid programs in Nicaragua.
He sought a declaration that would
allow him to withhold that portion
of his dues which were spent on
non-collective bargaining causes that
he did not agree with. Mr. Lavigne
was successful before the Ontario
Supreme Court, but lost at the
Ontario Court of Appeal, and then
appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada
was unanimous in dismissing Mr.
Lavigne’s application. The heart of
the Supreme Court’s decision was
expressed in the judgement of
Justice Gerald La Forest. He noted
that the purpose of the Rand
Formula was to ensure that unions
have sufficient resources to
participate in shaping the political,
economic, and social context of
labour relations, and to contribute to
democracy in the workplace. Before
reviewing the importance of the
Formula to the democratic
development of unions, La Forest set
the dues deduction system within a
wider social context:
“The first [objective] is to ensure
that unions have both the
resources and the mandate
necessary to enable them to play a
role in shaping the political,
economic and social context
within which particular collective
agreements and labour relations
disputes will be negotiated or
resolved. The balance of power
between management and labour
at any given time or in any
particular industry or workplace
is a product of many factors. It is
also a product of the state of
government legislation and
policy, most obviously in the area
of labour relations itself, but also
in regard to social and economic
policy generally.”
The Justice then spoke to the
importance of legislative restraint as
a social tool in fostering union
autonomy and democratic self-
government. Particularly significant
was his recognition of the
independence of unions as social
actors:
“The integrity and status of
unions as democracies would be
jeopardized if the government’s
policy was, in effect, that unions
can spend their funds as they
choose according to majority vote
provided the majority chooses to
make expenditures the
government thinks are in the
interest of the union’s
membership. It is, therefore, for
the union itself to decide, by
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majority vote, which causes or
organizations it will support in
the interests of favourably
influencing the political, social
and economic environment in
which particular instances of
collective bargaining and labour-
management dispute resolution
will take place. The old slogan
that self-government entails the
right to be wrong may be a good
way of summing up the
government’s objective of
fostering genuine and meaningful
democracy in the workplace.”
Finally, Justice La Forest connected
the relationship between the present
system of mandatory union dues
payments and its encouragement of
union democracy by promoting
solidarity:
“Compelling contributions by all
represented by the union, all who
benefit from the union’s attempt
to push the general political,
social and economic environment
in a direction favourable to
unions and their members,
provides the union with the
stable financial base needed to
underwrite political, economic
and social activism. The fact that
no restriction is put on the
manner in which money is
expended leaves the decision as
to what is and what is not in the
interests of the union and its
members in the hands of the
union membership. It, therefore,
clearly has the effect of promoting
democratic unionism, I would
add that the ability to opt out
would undermine the spirit of
solidarity which is so important
to the emotional and symbolic
underpinnings of unionism.”
Lavigne is emblematic in several
significant ways of the approach by
Canadian labour law towards
unions and their internal
governance. First, the principles of
majoritarianism and exclusive
representation have been found to
be consistent with the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of association
and expression. Second, the
compulsory payment of union dues,
and the expenditure of those dues
funds on social and political causes
outside of the realm of collective
bargaining, have also been found to
be compliant with the Charter.
Third, the modest degree of
legislative intervention into the
internal affairs of unions in Canada
has been reinforced by the Supreme
Court on the specific grounds of
promoting democracy and
autonomy. And fourth, the
protection of the rights of individual
employees and members within
unions, in itself an important value,
is to be balanced against the
necessary requirements for
solidarity and collective action that
provide unions with the primary
source of their strength.
Underlying the decision in
Lavigne is the implicit endorsement
by the Supreme Court of the logic of
unions: their ability to transform an
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individual employee’s illusory
liberty to bargain on an equal
footing with her or his employer
into a meaningful collective liberty
for all members of the unit.
CONCLUSION
Unions combine two fundamental
and contradictory impulses that on
occasion rub up against each other.
On the one hand, unions are
autonomous societies that combine
service and civic responsibilities,
characterized by a tradition of open
democratic debate and dissent by
the membership in conventions and
committee meetings. Indeed,
without internal democracy, unions
would only add to the degree of
workplace hierarchy and obedience
that they are ostensibly there to
alleviate. On the other hand, they
are also economic organizations
that, to win better working and
social conditions for their members,
must depend on discipline,
solidarity, and institutional loyalty.
Unions must have power, internally
and externally, to exercise their role
in the workplace and in society.
Otherwise, the employment bargain
would be wholly one-sided.
There is little debate among
observers of contemporary
industrial relations that unions can
only fulfil their social and economic
mission if they are democratic
institutions. The focus among labour
lawyers and legislators, however,
has been on the degree of
intervention that the law should
make into the internal affairs of
trade unions. Some prominent
Canadian labour lawyers and
academics have argued that a more
elaborate code of democratic
conduct must be legislated in order
to ensure that the right to dissent,
the right to be heard, and the right to
participate are properly protected.
This argument for a union members’
bill of rights in Canada is based not
so much on any historic or
contemporary pattern of entrenched
abusive behaviour, as it is on the
growing political and economic role
of trade unions in modern society
and the consequent public
responsibilities that come with that
role. Implicit in this view is the
acceptance that the law can play a
substantial role in ensuring
membership control and
participation by regulating the
democratic behaviour of trade
unions.
Others have maintained that the
present level of legal supervision is
sufficient to ensure that unions are
fair and responsive to their
members, although many of the
powers presently possessed by the
courts should be removed and
placed with labour relations boards.
This view is premised on the belief
that unions, as essentially private
organizations, should be permitted
the greatest degree of autonomy
possible that is consistent with
ensuring that their membership is
entitled to fairness in matters
concerning both collective
agreements and internal affairs.
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Beyond providing the basic
requirements for internal fairness, it
argues that the sinews for union
democracy must come from the
creativity and maturity provided by
the experience of dynamic industrial
relations.
The approach in Canada has been
to accept the latter argument.
Unions have been permitted a
significant degree of autonomy,
tempered only by the requirements,
sometimes expressed by legislation,
but largely by the courts and the
common law, that they respect their
constitutional procedures, that their
members have the right to be heard
in internal proceedings, and that
their rules be free of unfairness and
discrimination. For reasons that may
or may not be peculiar to Canada,
this path has assisted in shaping a
trade union movement that it would
be fair to characterize as being
democratic in its character, civic in
its vision, responsive to its
membership, and increasingly more
representative of Canada’s social
diversity in its leadership.
Any serious political judgement
in the future as to whether the
degree of statutory intervention
should be increased ought to be
determined with the following three
tests in mind: (i) the efficacy of the
current level of judicial and labour
board supervision; (ii) the
continuing ability of trade unions to
provide democratic self-regulation;
and (iii) the level of legislative
regulation on the internal affairs of
other socially influential non-
governmental organizations, such as
corporations, political parties, and
religious institutions. The most
serious obstacle to greater
democracy within Canadian trade
unions appears to lie not in the
pattern of their behaviour, nor in
any particular restrictions in their
constitutions, but in the generally
low participation of the membership
in the political life of unions, except
in times of conflict or crisis. In the
world of representative institutions,
this is a common enough problem.
The question becomes whether the
law can realistically do more than
assure that the pre-requisites of
fairness are provided, leaving the
quality of democracy to emerge
through the life experiences of the
organization itself.
Note:
A longer version of this paper appeared in:
(2000), 21 Journal of Labor Research, 37-63.
